It really doesn't matter whether Iran prices their oil in dollars, euros, pesos, or seashells.
We have floating exchange rates.
Addition: Argus, in response to your message -
This is from an article that Paul Krugman wrote - he is an international expert on international finance. I regret that I do not have a link, but this is as brief as I can get without quoting a Macro textbook.
Most of the international role of the dollar comes from its use as a 鈥渦nit of account鈥濃€攖he measuring stick for international business. When a Japanese refiner buys Kuwaiti oil, say, the contracts are in dollars. This is a testament to U.S. economic influence, but flattery aside, it鈥檚 hard to see what we get out of it.
What about our ability to borrow in dollars, to sell dollar- denominated bonds to foreigners? Hey, other countries do that too. But our debts are in our own currency! So? We still pay interest on them. True, we could inflate away our foreign debt. But we won鈥檛鈥攁nd if investors thought we would, they would demand higher interest rates.
Well, then, you may say, surely the international role of the dollar forces people out there to hold dollars for transaction purposes. Yes, but not so you鈥檇 notice. When Daewoo repays a dollar loan from Sanwa, it writes a check on its account with some international bank. True, that bank itself surely maintains an account in New York, backed in part by non-interest-bearing reserves held at the Fed. So the U.S. does in effect get a zero-interest loan out of the dollar鈥檚 international role鈥攂ut it probably amounts to only a few billion dollars, small change for an $8 trillion economy.
If the Euro turns into a GLOBAL reserve currency, (not just for Iran) it MIGHT cost the U.S. economy as much as 0.1% of GDP.
I think we'll manage.
Additionally, it is doubtful it WILL lose global reserve currency status because there are very few places outside of the US where one can park huge amounts of capital.
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